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Abstract 
 
Earlier studies suggest that income taxation may affect not only labour supply but also 
domestic work.  Here we investigate the impact of income taxation on partners’ labour supply 
and housework, using data for France that taxes incomes of married couples jointly.  We 
estimate a household utility model in which the marginal utilities of leisure and housework of 
both partners are modelled as random coefficients, depending on observed and unobserved 
characteristics.  We conclude that both partners’ market and housework hours are responsive 
to changes in the tax system. A policy simulation suggests that replacing joint taxation of 
married spouses’ incomes with separate taxation would increase the husband’s housework 
hours by 1.3% and reduce his labour supply by 0.8%. The wife’s market hours would increase 
by 3.7%, and her housework hours would fall by 2.0%.  
                                                 
*
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Highlights: 
-Joint taxation of spouses’ incomes is likely to discourage female labour supply.  
-Joint taxation is likely to reinforce female specialization in house work. 
-We study how switching to independent taxation affects spouses’ time allocation. 
-We find that the husband’s house work increases while the wife’s housework drops.  
-We conclude that the wife’s labour supply increases while the husband’s hours fall.   
 
Keywords: time use, taxation, discrete choice models 
JEL classification: J22, H31, C35  
 
3 
 
1.  Introduction 
Theoretical studies of income taxation conclude that income taxes may affect not only 
individual labour supply but also the amount of domestic work produced within the 
household.  Income taxation is likely to affect labour supply and housework hours in opposite 
directions because downward changes in the individual rewards from work reduce the 
individual opportunity cost of housework and thus, housework becomes more attractive than 
market work. There is limited empirical evidence on this issue. This paper adds to the 
literature by estimating a discrete choice model of both partners’ market and housework 
hours. Using these estimates, we simulate how a change from joint to separate taxation of 
married spouses’ incomes affects spouses’ hours of market and non-market work. This is 
especially interesting since France is one of the few OECD countries that still taxes the 
incomes of married couples jointly.    
Apps and Rees (1988, 1999, 2011) argue that although household production is not 
taxed (which is unavoidable since its output cannot be observed), the taxation of income is 
likely to affect not only labour supply but also housework hours of spouses. In particular, 
married women’s labour supply is likely to increase when replacing joint taxation by separate 
income taxation while housework hours are expected to fall.1  Leuthold (1983) estimated the 
tax elasticities of housework of husband and wife in one and two-earner US households, using 
a single equation framework, and found that (joint) income taxation increases housework 
hours of women and reduces housework hours of men. Gelber and Mitchell (2012), focusing 
on American single women, concluded that when the economic rewards for participating in 
the labour force increase, single women’s market work increases and their housework 
decreases.  Rogerson (2009) examined the effects of taxation on housework and labour supply 
in the US and Europe from a macroeconomic perspective, and found that when accounting for 
                                                 
1
 See also Kleven et al. (2010) for a recent treatment of the optimal taxation of couples. Alesina et al. (2011) 
analyze how applying different income tax rates for secondary and primary earners  (“selective” taxation) can 
affect the distribution of market work and housework within the household.  
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home production, the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure becomes 
almost irrelevant in determining the response of market hours to higher taxes.  
In this paper we estimate a discrete choice model of both partners’ market labour 
supply and housework hours. Partners’ time allocation choices are modelled as the outcome 
of maximizing a household utility function which includes household net income among its 
arguments.  The model accounts for corner solutions (non-participation) in the labour market 
as well as non-participation in housework. Fixed costs of paid work are also incorporated. To 
approximate continuous hours decisions, each household’s choice set is discretized and has 
2,401points. The use of a discrete choice specification enables us to incorporate non-linear 
taxes and welfare benefits.    
The model is estimated on data drawn from the 1998-1999 French Time Use Survey. 
This survey has the advantage of covering a period during which the incomes of French 
married spouses were taxed jointly and the incomes of cohabiting partners’ were taxed 
separately.  Moreover, a time diary was collected for both partners in the household on the 
same day, which was chosen by the interviewer - in addition to a standard household 
questionnaire and an individual questionnaire. We observe both partners’ market labour 
supply, housework hours, individual earnings, and household income, as well as the presence 
and age of children and other individual and household characteristics.   
We find positive own net wage elasticities of market work (equal to 0.20 for the male 
partner and 0.55 for the female partner) and negative own wage elasticities of housework 
hours (equal to -0.34 for the male partner and  -0.36 for the female partner). An increase in the 
partner’s wage rate reduces own market hours and increases own housework hours. These 
cross effects are smaller though than the own-wage effects, as usually found for market work. 
Own and cross-wage effects are larger for the wife’s market hours than for the husband’s, as it 
is often found in empirical labour supply studies.   
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Finally, we simulate the effects of a shift from the current system of joint taxation of 
married spouses’ incomes to separate income taxation.2 Joint taxation of spouses’ incomes is 
mandatory in France.  Separate income taxation is applied in most OECD countries, though in 
some countries (for example, the US and Spain), married couples have the option to choose 
between separate or joint taxation of their incomes. In line with the theoretical expectations, 
we find that replacing joint taxation of married spouses’ incomes with separate taxation would 
lead to opposite effects for the husband (often the main earner) and the wife (usually the 
secondary earner): her labour supply would increase while his would fall; and her housework 
would fall while his would increase. We conclude that replacing joint taxation with separate 
taxation of married spouses’ incomes would increase the wife’s participation in paid work by 
2.3%-points and her average market hours by 3.7%, while her housework hours would drop 
by 2.0%. The husband would partly compensate for the changes in the wife’s time allocation 
by increasing his housework hours by 1.3% and reducing his market hours by 0.8%. These 
effects, though statistically significant, represent only a small step towards balancing market 
and non-market work of the husband and the wife. 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  The model is presented in Section 2.  Section 
3 provides an overview of the French income tax system.  The data are described in Section 4.  
The estimation results and the simulations are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.   
                                                 
2
 This extends the work of, for example, Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) and Callan et al. (2009), who estimated the 
influence of a similar reform of income taxation for Germany and Ireland, respectively, but only looked at 
market work of the two partners. . However, we leave the nature of the welfare system unchanged which is such 
that welfare payments are means-tested against total household income for both married and cohabiting couples 
and may, therefore, discourage labour supply of the secondary earner in the household (usually the female 
partner).  
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2. The discrete choice model  
Our model is an extension of the unitary discrete choice model of household labour 
supply of van Soest (1995).3  Here we allow individuals in a couple to choose between market 
work, housework, and leisure. Conventional models allow individuals to choose between 
market work and everything else, thus treating housework as “pure” leisure.  In our model 
household utility depends on both partners’ time allocation and on after-tax household 
income.  This last varies with the allocation of hours of market work chosen by the partners 
and their gross wage rates, given the tax and benefits system. We also specify fixed costs of 
market work and allow for unobserved heterogeneity in partners’ preferences. The choice set 
is discretized and includes an error term that is specific to each possible choice under  a 
random utility framework.   
Theoretical set up 
Formally, let m denote the ‘husband’ and f the ‘wife’ (naming for the sake of 
simplicity, the female partner as the ‘wife’ and the male partner as the ‘husband’, regardless 
of the couple marital status), let l
mt  and lft  be the leisure hours of husband and wife, wmt  and
w
ft  their labour supplies, and hmt  and hft  their housework hours. The utility maximized by the 
couple household is a function of partners’ labour supply, housework, leisure and the ensuing 
after tax household income. Because the total time allocation is fixed (it cannot exceed 24 
hours a day), we can write utility as a function V of only five arguments, taking market work 
as the residual category (see time constraint below): 
(1)  ( , , , , )l h l hm m f fV V t t t t y .  
  
                                                 
3
 A discrete choice model of labour supply has also been used by, for example, Aaberge et al. (1995, 1999), 
Hoynes (1996), and Keane and Moffitt (1998).  See also Dagsvik (1994) on the theoretical foundation of the 
usual functional form assumptions in this type of model. 
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The budget constraint (2) gives family income y after taxes and benefits as a function of gross 
earnings, total household non-labour income 0Y , and the amount of taxes and benefits T,4 
which depends on the various income components and on household characteristics X: 
(2) 0 0 0} 0}( , , , ) { {m fw w w w w wm m m m mf f f f fFC FCy w t w t Y T Y w t w t X t t      1 1  
 
Partners’ gross wage rates are denoted by mw and fw .  The final two terms reflect the fixed 
costs of market work of each partner (where }{.1  denotes the indicator function as standard). 
The household also faces two time constraints given by the total hours endowment E (say 24 
hours per day) for each partner: 
(3)  
l w h
m m m
l w h
f f f
t E t t
t E t t
      
 
Therefore, household production is not modelled explicitly as for example in Apps and Rees 
(1999), but is incorporated implicitly by allowing the partners’ paid and unpaid housework to 
enter the model through  and .  Here the marginal utilities capture not only how partners 
value paid work relative to housework, but also the utility that comes from household 
production (which increases with  and ).5 In particular, the implications of the model as 
given by the expected signs of the partial derivatives of V are as follows: 
 l
m
V
t
    if husband’s leisure is preferred to husband’s paid work, keeping constant the 
other arguments of V (including husband’s housework and after tax family income y). 
 0l
f
V
t
  if leisure of the wife is preferred to paid work of the wife, keeping other 
factors constant. 
                                                 
4
 T also captures welfare transfers (see Section 3), which can be seen as negative tax payments.  
5
 The model does not specify private consumption (this is not observed in the data either), which implies that we 
cannot analyze the consequences of policy changes that affect the prices of goods or services bought from the 
market (such as a change in VAT) and that may substitute for home produced goods or services (not subject to 
VAT, as it is hard to measure the output of home production).  
h
mt hft
h
mt hft
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 0h
m
V
t
   if housework done by the husband is preferred to paid work done by the 
husband, keeping other arguments of V constant, including l
mt and  y. If paid and unpaid 
work hours are equally attractive or unattractive, we expect  because 
housework increases household production, while income from paid work (y) is kept 
constant.   
 0h
f
V
t
   if housework done by the wife is preferred to paid work done by the wife, 
keeping the other arguments of V constant. 
 0Vy   if more household income is better, keeping the allocation of hours chosen by 
the couple (and therefore also the household production) constant. 
 
As in Van Soest (1995), only the final inequality is needed to ensure that the model is 
consistent with the underlying theory as it excludes the possibility that utility falls with 
income -we assume that the household chooses a point on its budget frontier. There is no need 
to impose any restrictions on the second order derivatives of V, such as quasi-concavity 
because to estimate the model we do not have to recur to first and second derivatives –we 
simply need to compare a finite number of utility values. Finally, the model is static and we 
do not account for savings (see Blundell and Walker, 1986, for a two-stage budgeting 
approach).   
Empirical specification 
To implement the model empirically, we allow partners to choose their time allocation 
as follows. We consider 7 discrete possible choices for each activity and for each spouse, 
which results in a discrete choice set for the household of 7*7*7*7 = 2,401 possible choices.  
0h
m
V
t
 
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For each combination of paid and unpaid work hours of the two partners6 and for given gross 
wage rates and household non-labour income, we calculated income taxes and welfare 
transfers (see Section 3) and therefore, after tax income for each point in the choice set. We 
assume that partners can choose any combination of hours and ignore possible demand side 
restrictions (see, for example, Aaberge et al., 1999, for an extensive and more complete 
approach to this issue). However, our baseline model does incorporate fixed costs of paid 
work which may partly account for some of these rigidities (and see also robustness checks in 
Section 5).7 We use a flexible quadratic objective function:8 
(4) ( ' 'V A b      ; ( , , , , )l h l hm m f ft t t t y  , 
where A is a symmetric 5*5 matrix of unknown parameters with entries αij  (i,j=1,…,5), and 
b=(b1, …, b5)’ is a five-dimensional vector.   We assume that b1, …, b4 are functions of a 
vector x of observed household characteristics (such as partners’ ages, and the numbers of 
children in several age groups) and of unobserved characteristics using the following 
specification:9  
 (5) 1,2,3,4,j jkj k
k
b x j    
 
Here the four unobserved heterogeneity components 1,2,3,4)j j    are assumed to be 
normally distributed with mean zero and arbitrary covariance matrix, independent of the xk 
and of other exogenous components of the model, such as the household’s non-labour income 
and the determinants of gross wage rates. To keep the numerical optimization of the 
likelihood practically feasible, we do not parameterize αij  (i,j=1,…,5) or b5, but assume they 
                                                 
6
 For paid work of men and women, the choices are 0, 1.6, 3.2, 4.8, 6.4, 8 and 9.6 hours per weekday. For 
housework, we use slightly different choices for the two partners (because of the large differences in the 
observed sample distributions of housework hours of partners, see Section 3). We specify  0. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 
hours per weekday for men, and 1, 2.5, 3.5, 4.5, 5.75, 7.5 and 9.5 hours per weekday for women.  
7
 It may also be argued that each household needs to do a certain amount of housework, particularly if there are 
children.   
8
 To simplify the computational burden, the coefficient of income squared is set to zero, following, for example, 
Van Soest et al. (2002). 
9
 The index of the household is suppressed. 
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are the same for all households.10  Fixed costs of paid work are not observed but are modelled 
as two unknown parameters to be estimated (one for each partner).  
 Random error terms are added to the utilities of all m=2,401 points in the household’s 
choice set as in Van Soest (1995): 
(6)  
2 independent of each other and of everything else
( , , , , ) 1,2,..., ;
GEV(I); 1,2,...,
, ,.....,
l l h h
j mj mj j jfj fj
j
m
V V t t t t y j m
j m
   
        
 
GEV(I) denotes the type I extreme value distribution with cumulative density 
Pr ) = exp( exp( ))j z z    . It is assumed that each household chooses the option j that 
maximizes jV .  Our specification of the error terms implies that the conditional probability 
that a given combination j is chosen (given observed and unobserved individual 
characteristics, wage rates, other household income, and income taxes), is the following 
(multinomial logit type) probability:11 
(7) 
1
Pr  for all k j|....) = exp( ( , , , , )) / exp( ( , , , , ))ml l h h l l h hj mj mj jk fj fj mk fk mk fk k
k
V V V t t t t y V t t t t y     
The scale of the utility function is thus fixed by the magnitude of the common 
variance of the error terms j . The errors can be interpreted as unobserved utility components 
that make specific combinations of hours in the choice set more attractive than others (in line 
with the random utility concept in the standard multinomial logit model), or as optimization 
errors (e.g., errors in the household’s perception of the alternatives’ utilities).  
 The probabilities in (7) depend upon the values of the unobserved heterogeneity terms. 
In order to construct the likelihood contribution of a given household, these terms need to be 
integrated out. The likelihood contribution then becomes:  
                                                 
10
 As usual, the utility function is identified up to a monotonic transformation only. This would make it hard to 
identify the parameters in a more general model. 
11
 For partners that report to be employed but do not report (regular) working hours, the likelihood contribution 
is set equal to the sum of all the probabilities of reporting positive hours choices.    
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(8) Pr[ , , , ) ( , , , )] | ,....) ( )Pr  for all k jl l h h l l h hm f m f mj fj mj fj j kt t t t t t t t p dV V                   
Here ( )p  is the density of the vector  of unobserved heterogeneity terms.12  The likelihood 
expression involves four-dimensional integrals, which are approximated using simulated 
maximum likelihood (see Train, 2003).13 
 The likelihood contribution in equation (8) assumes that gross wage rates are observed 
and exogenous. Therefore, we estimated Heckman selection type of model of partner’s gross 
wages (separately for men and women) to be able to predict wages for non-participants (as 
well as for individuals that did not report wages; see Section 4 for more details). We replaced 
observed wages with predicted wages for everyone in the sample and, alternatively, we tested 
for the sensitivity of the estimates to using observed wage rates whenever available.14  
3. Income taxes and benefits 
Married spouses are subject to joint taxation of their incomes (that are are added up for 
income tax purposes) in France. This typically leads to a lower tax rate for the primary earner 
(usually the husband) and viceversa, a larger tax rate for the secondary earner (often the wife) 
than under separate income taxation. It follows that joint taxation of spouses’ incomes may 
create disincentives to work longer for secondary earners while possibly making housework 
more attractive (as an extra hour of market work is taxed at a higher tax rate than under 
independent taxation while housework is not taxed) . Most OECD countries have moved to a 
system of individual taxation or allow couples to choose between the two systems. In contrast 
to married spouses, cohabiting partners’ incomes were taxed separately in France at the time 
                                                 
12
 The notation here does not make the conditioning on observed variables explicit, for simplicity.  
13
 We used 100 Halton draws for each household and each unobserved heterogeneity term.  
14
 The difference between the results of estimation under these two alternative approaches can also be seen as a 
robustness check. Ideally, the wage equations should be estimated jointly with the structural model, which 
would, however, substantially increase the computational burden. 
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of our survey data.15   Here we model the income tax system for both married and cohabiting 
partners.  
A key feature of the French income tax scheme is the “family quotient” ("quotient 
familial" ), say q. The family quotient gives weight one to each married spouse, weight 0.5 to 
the first and second child, and weight one to children of birth order higher than two. Total 
(household) taxable income is divided by q before applying the tax brackets (see Figure 1), 
and then the resulting amount is multiplied by q to give the income tax payable by the 
household.  Thus, for a married couple with two children, total taxable income of the two 
spouses is divided by q=1+1+0.5+0.5=3 before applying the tax brackets, and the resulting 
amount is multiplied by 3 to give the total income tax payable by the household. In contrast, 
for an unmarried couple with two children, the two partners file income taxes separately, and 
thus must choose how to report children for income tax purposes. If each of them reports one 
child, the family quotient for each of them will be q=1+0.5=1.5.  Combined with the 
progressive income tax brackets, this system implies that keeping household income constant, 
the tax paid by a married couple may well be lower than that paid by a cohabiting couple. In 
particular, a married couple in which only one spouse works and earns, say, y* will pay as 
much income tax as a married couple in which both spouses work and together earn y* (and 
less income tax than a cohabiting couple in which only one spouse works and earns y*). It 
follows that this system may discourage participation of married secondary earners (see, for 
example, Apps and Rees, 2011, or Stancanelli, 2008).  
The 1998 French income tax brackets that applied to total taxable household income 
are illustrated in Figure 1. There were six income brackets with marginal rates increasing 
from zero to 54%. The base is gross household income (net of payroll taxes or social security 
contributions).  To calculate the household income tax payable, the following steps are taken:  
                                                 
15
 Only since the introduction of the “Pacte Civil de Solidarité et de concubinage (pacs)” in 1999, unmarried 
couples can file jointly, after an initial waiting time of three years. Thus, they could not file jointly before 2002.     
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1. Standard deductions (on average 28% of total household income16) are 
subtracted from total household income to give ‘taxable’ household income. 
2. Taxable income Y is divided by the family quotient, q, which gives the taxable 
income ratio Y’.   
3. The tax rates shown in Figure 1 are applied to Y’ producing T’. 
4. The amount T’ is multiplied by q and this gives the income tax payable, T.   
5. Low-income households benefit from an additional income tax reduction 
according to a formula (“la decote”) that depends on the income tax payable 
(T) itself.17 
According to administrative sources18  the average (effective) income tax rate for 
married couples aged less than 60 – the same age cut-off that we use in our sample - is 5.34%, 
much lower than in most OECD countries, and more than 25% did not pay any income taxes. 
This is in line with our calculations. For example, a married couple with two children and 
total annual income of €60,000 has an effective tax rate of approximately 8%, which is low by 
international standards. Let us note again that unlike in other countries, these income tax rates 
do not include social security premiums, which are very large in France19, and a considerable 
part of government revenue in France is raised by means of value added tax20 (that is, 
regressive taxation) which we do not model here.  
Figures 2 and 3 show the average tax rate for the household (calculated as the amount 
of total household tax payable, divided by the total income of both partners) as a function of 
                                                 
16
 Following a similar approach as, for example, Bourguignon  and Magnac (1990).  
17
 If the total income tax payable (T), was less than €508, it was reduced to max (0, 2T-508). Low-income 
cohabiting partners could both benefit from this tax reduction. 
18
 Enquête Revenus Fiscaux, drawn from administrative income tax files, INSEE, Paris, 1998. 
19
 Besides, the survey collects information on wages net of social security contributions and gross of income 
taxes. Thus, we do not observe social security contributions and we do not model them either.  Social security 
contributions are levied on both employers and employees and their design is extremely complicated.  
20
 The amount of revenue levied by means of value added taxes is equal to about 7 per cent of GDP against 10.3 
of GDP for income tax revenue 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Tax_revenue_statistics). Goods produced within 
the household such as home cooked meals are not subject to value added tax since the output of household 
production is hard to measure. In contrast, private goods bought from the market are subject to value added tax.  
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her annual earnings, and holding fixed his annual earnings.  For married couples, the tax rate 
on each additional euro depends on the earnings of both spouses. For cohabiting couples, who 
are subject to individual taxation, the tax rate on her earnings is independent of his earnings.  
As a consequence, cohabiting women pay no income tax if their earnings are very low. The 
average household tax rate as a function of her earnings (which is depicted in Figures 2 and 
3), is higher at lower earnings of the female partner in (childless) cohabiting couples than in 
(childless) married couples (see panels 2, 3 and 4 in Figures 2), simply because in married 
couples the couple’s earnings are divided by two (q=2) before applying the tax schedule (see 
discussion above).  If the couple has children, cohabiting partners can choose who reports 
them in order to minimize their income tax burden (see also Figure 3), and this is the 
assumption we make in our model, in which we assume that cohabiting couples report their 
children for tax file purposes so as to minimize the total tax burden. It follows that for various 
combinations of partners’ earnings and family composition, the couple may pay a different 
income tax for similar total household level depending on marital status (which we take as 
given here).   
Finally, our model does not account for unemployment benefits (which are temporary 
and depend upon labour market history and involuntary job loss), but we do incorporate social 
assistance benefits, in line with the literature on static discrete choice labour supply models 
(see, for example, Van Soest, 1995). Social assistance benefits are means tested (conditional) 
on total household income for both married and cohabiting couples and increase with the 
number of children. We do not explicitly incorporate the costs of child care but control for the 
presence and ages of children in the model as well as including fixed costs of work for both 
partners. 21 
                                                 
21
 Child care costs of children younger than three vary with the form of childcare used by the household but are 
all tax deductible. Children of age three to six are enrolled in maternal school, which is open ten hours a day and 
free of charge (a symbolic fee is paid for meals, proportional to household income) and almost 100% of French 
children in this age range are enrolled into maternal school. Older children are enrolled in elementary school 
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4. The data  
The data for the analysis are drawn from the 1998-99 French Time Use Survey, 
carried out by the National Statistical offices (INSEE).  This survey is a representative sample 
of more than 8,000 French households with over 20,000 individuals of all ages. Selecting 
couples, married or cohabiting but living together, gave a sample of 5,287 couples with and 
without children.  The response rate to the survey was 80% for couples (see also, for example, 
Lesnard, 2009). We selected couples in which both partners were younger than 60 – the legal 
minimum retirement age for most workers in France in 1998-99 – and neither spouse was in 
full-time education, in the military, on disability benefits, or in early retirement.22 We kept 
self-employed individuals in the sample (whose hours, earnings and total household income 
were reported in the same way as for employees). 
  Three questionnaires were collected: a household and an individual questionnaire, and 
a time use diary.  The diary was filled in by all household members on the same day, and this 
day was chosen by the interviewer. About two thirds of the sample filled in the time diary on 
a week day, and less than a third on a weekend day. We dropped all households who filled in 
the diary on a weekend day (on which housework is typically not constrained by hours of paid 
work23) or on an atypical day (like a vacation day, a day of a wedding or a funeral, or a sick 
leave day), as well as households in which either partner did not fill in the diary. Dropping 
observations of households who were chosen to complete their time use diaries at the 
weekend implies that our results refer to partners’ time use on week days only. Our final 
sample for analysis contains 2,141 couples. Table 1 shows how many households are deleted 
from the sample in each of the selection steps described above.  
Sample descriptives, wages and income variables 
                                                                                                                                                        
which is also open ten hours a day and free of charge (a symbolic fee is paid for meals, proportional to 
household income). 
22
 We kept housewives as well as men who report that housework is their main occupation (less than ten cases).  
23
 Very few individuals reported any paid work at weekends. 
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Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics. The average number of dependent 
children younger than 18 years in the household was slightly over one, implying that 39% of 
couples in the sample had no children. Only 6% of the sample were not French nationals.  
Approximately 18% lived in the region of Paris (“Ile-de-France”). Married couples 
represented 79% of the sample while the remaining 21% were cohabiting.  Hourly earnings 
were computed for respondents who reported continuous (monthly) earnings information, 
dividing (gross of income tax and net of social security contributions) earnings by usual hours 
of paid work. The observed average gross wage rates were €9.83 per hour for men and €8.24 
for women. About 94% of the men and 70% of the women were engaged in gainful 
employment at the time of the survey.  About 20% of men and women were self-employed. 
Average usual hours worked per week were roughly 29 for men and 19 for women, including 
the zeros for non-workers. Moreover, 360 men and 240 women did not report usual hours, but 
did report that they were involved in gainful employment. In this case we know that their 
usual hours are positive and thus, account for this when specifying their likelihood 
contribution (see Section 2 for details).  
We predicted wage rates for non-participants as well as for those that did not report 
wages by estimating a Heckman selection model for men and women separately (see 
Appendix A). In particular, surveyed individuals were given the choice to either report in 
which broad interval their earnings fell or to report the exact monthly earnings. We only use 
information on exact (continuous) wages in the Heckman model. These reported measures of 
earnings are all (gross) before income tax but net of social security premiums. 24 Moreover, to 
predict gross (before income tax) hourly wages we use a larger sample than the one used to 
estimate the model, as we also include singles as well as individuals that answered the diary 
                                                 
24
 Wage rates below half the legal minimum were set to missing (since in some  jobs like for example full-time 
baby-sitting and other special employment contracts, it is legal to pay as low as half the minimum wage per 
hour). Wage rate predictions were never below the minimum wage. The Heckman selection equations were 
estimated using a larger sample that included also weekend diaries.  
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on a weekend day or an exceptional day. The presence and age of children and the presence of 
other adults in the household were used to identify the male selection equation from the wage 
equation. To identify the female selection equation we additionally used marital status 
dummies, as marital status turned out not to affect female (hourly) wage rates25 and, therefore, 
these exclusion restrictions we statistically significant.  The selection term is large and 
significantly positive for women, implying that women with unobserved characteristics that 
make them more productive have a larger participation probability.  The exclusion restrictions 
are not significant for the male participation equation, except for the presence of children aged 
less than three years, which is significant at the ten per cent level (see Appendix A), and the 
selection term for male participation is not statistically significant.  This is not surprising as 
most men would like to work for pay in the market as commonly found in earlier literature. 
Next, we conclude that potential experience and education affect significantly wage rates of 
both men and women –and this may also help identify predicted wages in the discrete choice 
model. Ideally one would like to estimate wages simultaneously with the discrete choice 
model (see Section 2). The lack of exogenous source of variation in wages is a drawback of 
using such a cross-sectional dataset, which on the other hand is one of the rare surveys to 
provide detailed information on both partners’ time allocation and income. We test for the 
sensitivity of the results of estimation of the model to using observed wages for individuals 
that reported continuous wages or replacing wages with predicted wages for everyone in the 
sample (see next section).   
More than 25% of the sample reported zero non-labour household income (see Table 
3). Non-labour household income represents approximately 25% of total household income 
                                                 
25
 This is in line with earlier literature that suggests that employers expect all women to marry at some stage and 
thus apply the same wage ‘penalty’ to all women, regardless of marital status. Indeed, we found significant wage 
premiums for married men but not for married women. 
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before taxes.26 The average effective tax rate (the ratio of total household income tax and total 
household before tax income) is approximately 5.6% of total household (before tax) income, 
which is well in line with the administrative data (see also Table 1 and Section 3).  The 
average effective income tax rate is lower for married couples (5.5% on average) than for 
cohabiting couples (6.1%).  
Time allocation  
The diary was filled in by each partner on the same week day, which was chosen by the 
interviewer, spanning 24 hours.  Activities were coded in ten minutes slots and approximately 
140 possible activities were distinguished by the survey coders. Here, we distinguish the 
following ‘primary’27 activities:  
1. Paid work, carried out either at home or at an outside work place. 
2. Housework, defined to include cleaning, shopping, cooking, doing the laundry, setting 
and unsetting the table, doing the dishes, doing administrative work for the household 
as well as any (primary) time spent caring for children.  
3. “Leisure” time, defined as any time devoted to leisure (watching television, doing 
sports, socializing and recreational activities), ‘semi-leisure activities’ (such as 
gardening or taking care of pets), as well as personal care and sleeping time. 
 
The distribution of partners’ time allocations is illustrated in Table 4, which shows that men 
do the bulk of paid work: the median “husband” in the sample spends approximately 480 
minutes (8 hours) on market work, compared to 240 minutes (4 hours) for the median “wife” 
–denoting the male partner as the ‘husband’ and the female partner as the ‘wife’, for 
simplicity, as we have included cohabiting couples in the sample.  In contrast, women 
                                                 
26
 This is before accounting for welfare benefits that are included in our simulation model (see Section 3 for 
details). 
27
 Respondents were also asked to fill in “secondary” activities which are activities carried out simultaneously, 
such as cooking while taking care of children.  The respondent may report childcare as primary activity and 
cooking as secondary activity or vice versa. Generally, ignoring secondary activities is likely to underestimate 
the amount of unpaid work. However, very few respondents in the sample reported some secondary activities, 
and thus, we resolved to ignore secondary activities. Moreover, if we counted in also time spent on secondary 
activities, the time budget would not satisfy the 24 hours constraint any longer.     
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perform most of the housework: with the median “wife” doing 240 minutes of housework 
against 30 minutes for the median “husband”.28 Interestingly, a comparison of total paid and 
unpaid work time of partners shows that the median “wife” works 10 minutes more than the 
median “husband” (see also Burda et al., 2013, on total work load by gender).  In the 
empirical analysis, the time spent on paid work and housework, respectively, by each partner, 
is rounded to the nearest of the seven discrete point intervals in the choice set (see Section 2).  
Finally, to better grasp within-couple differences in the division of paid and unpaid 
work, we present the share of the husband’s time in the total time devoted by the couple to 
each activity (see Table 5).  This shows that the husband provides on average 61% of the paid 
work done by the couple (and 67% of the median). In contrast, the median husband performs 
only 12.5% of the couple’s housework load.  The husband performs on average 45% of the 
total market and non-market work carried out by the couple (and 47% if we consider the 
median).  To sum up, the wife tends to perform a little more work than the husband (and we 
have ignored here multi-tasking which is disproportionately done by women, as shown, for 
example, by Sayer, 2007). Our model will focus on whether this division of time allocations is 
sensitive to changes in tax rates and other financial incentives. 
                                                 
28
 See also Frazis and Stewart (2012) for a discussion of the limitations of using distributional comparisons.  
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5. Results of estimation of the model and income tax simulations 
 We have specified a discrete choice utility model that allows both partners to choose 
between various combinations of market and housework hours and household net income (see 
Section 2).  We modelled income taxes and benefits for both married and cohabiting couples 
(see Section 3) and estimated the model using French cross-sectional data on partners’ time 
allocation and income (see Section 4). Here we present the results of estimation of the model 
and illustrate partners’ time allocation responses to changes in net wage rates or non-labour 
income as well as simulating an income tax reform that would tax the incomes of married 
spouses separately (and cohabiting partners jointly).   
Baseline model 
We have allowed the parameters of the utility function (b1, …,b4 in Section 2) to vary 
with partners and household characteristics (see equation (5) in Section 2) such as age, marital 
status, the presence and the age of dependent children. The systematic part of the utility 
function therefore, contains interactions of leisure and unpaid housework with the covariates. 
The parameter estimates of the systematic part of the utility function are given in Table 6.  
The first block of coefficients in Table 6 is hard to interpret due to the quadratic and 
interaction terms. Therefore, Table 8 presents the average marginal derivatives of the utility 
function with respect to its five arguments, as well as the fractions of sample observations for 
which the predicted marginal utility is negative.  
We find that the objective function increases with the level of household income for 
each combination of partners’ leisure and housework hours chosen by the couples in the 
sample –as required for our model to have any meaningful economic interpretation (see also 
Section 2).  Moreover, we conclude that most couples in the sample will choose more leisure 
than paid work for a given level of household income and housework hours, as reasonable. 
Nevertheless, the marginal utility of leisure is negative for about 27 percent of the male 
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partners and about 42 percent of the female partners –meaning that some would be willing to 
work for free if there were no fixed costs of work (the fixed costs of work prevent them from 
doing so, see Table 6). The marginal utility of housework is positive for 65.2% of the women 
and 69.1% of the men, which indicates that (keeping household income constant), housework 
is more attractive than paid work for them, possibly because of the implied household 
production output (which is not kept constant in the model, see Section 2). 
 Moreover, a positive coefficient on the interaction of, for example,  her age and her 
leisure hours implies a positive effect of her age on her marginal utility of leisure and a 
negative effect of her age on her marginal utility of paid work hours, ‘ceteris paribus’.  A 
positive coefficient on one of the interactions with her (his) housework similarly implies a 
positive effect on the marginal utility of her (his) housework against her (his) paid work.  For 
example, we conclude that being married reduces the marginal utility of his housework, 
suggesting that cohabiting men perform more housework than married men. A plausible 
explanation for this finding is that cohabiting couples are less traditional and have different 
norms concerning the roles of men and women in the family.  As expected, children - and 
young children in particular - strongly and significantly increase the marginal utilities of both 
partners’ housework, although the effect of children is smaller for him than for her.  
 Table 7 gives the estimates of the distribution of the four-dimensional vector of 
random effects 
 
in the marginal utilities of leisure and housework time of both partners (cf. 
Equation (5)). The top panel shows that all variances are significantly positive, although their 
magnitude varies, suggesting that there is more unobserved variation in the preferences for 
leisure (compared to paid work) than in the preferences for housework, which is well 
plausible. The bottom panel shows that all estimated correlations are significantly positive, 
implying, for example, that time use and preferences of both partners are positively 
correlated, which indicates positive assortative mating.   
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To gather some measure of the goodness of fit of our model, we compare predicted 
and observed (actual) participation rates and mean hours of market work and housework (see 
Table 9 and Figure 4).  Our model appears to fit better the distribution of (hours spent on) 
housework than that of market work. In particular, over-time work is under-predicted by the 
model. Incorporating fixed costs of work helps us to fit partners’ participation rates in paid 
work– as the model without fixed costs of work (see robustness checks) under predicts non-
participation while over-predicting small part-time jobs.  
Hours responses to changes in wages and non-labour income  
Next, we use the parameter estimates from the baseline model to simulate the 
sensitivity of partners’ time allocation decisions to changes in the (own or the partner’s) wage 
rate or changes in other household income.  In each scenario, the discrete distribution (with 
2,401 mass points) of the hours devoted by each partner to market work and housework is 
simulated for all the couples in the sample, accounting both for unobserved heterogeneity and 
the error terms of the model (see Section 2). In particular, we simulate upward changes in 
partner’s net wage rates as well as an increase in net non-labour household income. 
Simulating an upward change in the her  net wage allows us to estimate her  uncompensated 
own wage ‘elasticities’ of paid and unpaid work hours as well as  her participation rates and 
his corresponding cross wage ‘elasticities’ of market and housework hours.29 The net wage 
‘elasticities’ are computed by increasing the net reward for each additional hour of work by 
1% and then, comparing the outcomes for these new budget sets with the outcomes of the 
benchmark simulation, as usual. Similarly, the net non-labour income ‘elasticities’ are 
computed by first computing each household’s expected income in the benchmark scenario 
and then increasing non-labour income by 1% of this amount for all points in the choice set. 
To compute the standard errors we replicate each simulation using 500 draws of (the vector 
                                                 
29
 Simulating changes in before-income-tax (gross) wage rates instead of net wage rates gives similar elasticities 
(somewhat smaller in absolute magnitude).  
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of) the estimated parameters from the model (which was first estimated by simulated 
maximum likelihood using 100 draws, see also Section 2).  
We find that her own wage ‘elasticity’ of market work is 0.55 (see Table 10), which is 
somewhere in the range of earlier female elasticities found for France –it is larger than the 
estimate of, for example, Bargain et al. (2013) and smaller than some of the estimates 
reported in Blundell et al., 2013, and Bargain et al., 2013 (Appendix A.1). According to our 
estimates, his own net wage elasticity of market hours is equal to 0.20, which is quite large  
relative to earlier studies for France. More than half of the estimated responses of the own 
labour supply to changes in the own wage rate are due to changes in the own participation rate 
–and this is true for both the male and the female partner in the couple (and also in line with 
the findings of Bargain et al. (2013)).30   
The cross wage ‘elasticities’ of market hours are statistically significant and negative.  
They are smaller in absolute size than the own wage ‘elasticity’, though very sizeable and 
equal to -0.10 for his market hours (in response to a change in her wage rate) and -0.31 for her 
market hours (in response to a change in his wage rate). These estimates are larger than the 
corresponding cross-‘elasticities’ found by Bargain et al. (2013). According to our estimates, 
most of the his cross-‘elasticity’ is due to changes at the intensive margin while more than 
half of her cross-‘elasticity’ is due to changes at the extensive margin. Estimated non-labour 
income ‘elasticities’ of market hours are negative for both partners and equal, respectively, to 
-0.125 for the male partner, and -0.248 for the female partner. These last elasticities are 
mainly due to responses at the extensive margin31 and the standard errors indicate that they 
are quite precisely determined and statistically significant.  
                                                 
30
 Note that the participation changes are given in percentage points; for the wife (the husband), the elasticity of 
participation is about 1.42 (1.05) times as large. 
31
 Non-labour income elasticities are not comparable to those in Bargain et al. (2013) who only consider changes 
in capital income and find very small responses. 
Commentaire [JK1]: Inconsistent 
with our robustness check 
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The second panel of the table presents the ‘elasticities’ of both partners’ housework to 
changes in both partners’ wage rates and net household non-labour income. The female 
partner responds to an increase in her wage rate by reducing the time allocated to non-market 
work (the ‘elasticity’ is equal to -0.362). In absolute terms, following an upward change in the 
own wage, the reduction in her unpaid work is smaller than the increase of her market work, 
which implies a drop in her leisure hours.   Only a small (but statistically significant) part of 
the reduction in her housework is compensated by more housework been performed by the 
male partner -the cross elasticity of his housework to a change in her wage rate is 0.117. This 
implies that the amount of housework performed by the male partner varies only slightly in 
response to an increase in her wage rate(he spends on average 1.29 hours per weekday on 
housework according to our baseline estimates).   The significantly positive (though small) 
effect of an increase in her wage rate on his non-market work is in line with earlier findings 
by Bloemen and Stancanelli (2013), who did not account for income taxation.  
 The estimated ‘elasticity’ of his housework hours to his own wage rate is negative (-
0.337) and larger in absolute value than the wage ‘elasticity’ of his paid work. However, 
because men perform more hours of paid than unpaid work, the overall effect is smaller in 
absolute terms for housework than for paid work and it follows that an increase in his wage 
rate leads to a reduction in his leisure hours. The cross-effect of his wage rate on her 
housework hours is only marginally significant and quite small (the estimated elasticity is 
0.054). In particular, following an increase in his wage rate, his housework drops and hers 
increases -not enough though to compensate for the reduction in his housework hours, so that 
the total housework done by the couple falls. Thus, an increase of either his or her wage rate 
reduces the total housework done by the couple, and possibly leads to more outsourcing of 
household chores.32  
                                                 
32
 An analysis of outsourcing of housework is given in Stancanelli and Stratton (2013). It is outside the scope of 
the current paper. 
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Finally, the non-labour income ‘elasticity’ of the housework done by the male partner  
is negative and large in absolute value. In contrast, her housework response to a change in 
non-labour income is virtually zero and insignificant.  Thus, total housework falls if other 
income increases which may suggest perhaps more outsourcing of housework tasks or, 
possibly, more “multi-tasking” or “leaving housework undone” (see Sayer, 2007, for more 
insights into all these options).  
Simulations of income tax reforms     
Next we simulated the effects of changing the tax system from joint taxation to 
separate taxation of married spouses’ incomes, and viceversa for cohabiting partners. The two 
groups are split for these simulations: cohabiting couple are not included in the simulation of 
the income tax change for married spouses (for obvious reasons, as nothing changes for 
them), and viceversa, married couples are not included in the simulations for cohabiting 
partners.  
As anticipated (see Section 3), replacing joint with separate income taxation for 
married couples increases the wife’s participation and hours of market work and reduces the 
husband’s market hours: average hours of paid work fall by 0.75% for the husband and 
increase by 3.66% for the wife (see Table 11). In contrast, housework hours increase by 
1.28% for the husband and drop by 2.01% for the wife. Thus, these results suggest that 
replacing joint taxation with separate taxation of married spouses’ incomes would lead to a 
slightly more balanced distribution of market and non-market work between the spouses –
though according to our simulation only few partners would change their time allocation in 
response to the reform (less than ten per cent of the married couples in the sample).  
Next, we considered cohabiting couples and simulated their time allocation responses 
to replacing separate with joint taxation of their incomes. As expected, we find opposite 
patterns than above (see Table 11): cohabiting women are found to reduce their labour supply 
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and increase their housework hours while the opposite is true for cohabiting men. The size of 
the responses of married and cohabiting partners differ, though, and this may be explained by 
compositional effects -cohabiting couples are often younger and have fewer children on 
average than married couples.  
 
Robustness checks 
Various robustness checks were carried out (see Table 11).  We tested the stability of 
our estimation results by using a new set of Halton draws to estimate the distribution of the 
random coefficients. Next, we checked the robustness of the estimates to using the observed 
wages for individuals that reported continuous wages and replaced wages with predicted 
wages only for observations with missing wage information -this alternative approach 
implicitly assumes that the errors of the wage equation are independent of the unobservables 
of the discrete choice model of partners’ time allocation.  Furthermore, we re-estimated the 
model without allowing for fixed costs of work. Alternatively, we modelled restrictions to the 
availability of part-time jobs, including and excluding fixed costs of work. Finally, we 
estimated a simplified version of the model without housework, letting partners choose 
between leisure and market hours, ignoring housework in the model.   
Using a new set of Halton draws (see Column 3 of Table 12), some of the estimated 
elasticities are slightly different but the qualitative conclusions are not affected.  Replacing 
wages with predicted wages only for partners whose wages were not observed and thus, using 
reported wages whenever available (see Column 4 of Table 12), the results of the simulations 
are generally comparable, at least in terms of the direction of the effects, to those of our main 
specification, except for the elasticity of his housework which becomes positive in response to 
an increase in his wage or a change in the tax system,  from joint to  separate taxation of the 
incomes of married partners -though the size of both these effects is virtually zero. A possible 
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explanation for these counterintuitive results –which go in opposite direction to our main 
findings (see Column 2 of Table 12) - is that the errors of the wage equation are not 
independent of the unobservables of the model and thus, these new estimates are inconsistent.  
Assuming the absence of fixed costs of work (see Column 5 of Table 12), the results 
are not affected in terms of the direction of the effects but their size differs quite substantially, 
relative to our favourite specification.  Moreover, this specification fits the date worse than 
our preferred model (see earlier working paper version of the paper that did not account for 
fixed costs of work). In contrast, simulating restrictions in the availability of part-time jobs (as 
in Aaberge et al. (1995)), including or excluding fixed costs of work, improves the fit of the 
model (results not shown).  Under this scenario, the direction of the effects studies is the same 
as in our preferred specification but the size of the estimates varies sometime quite 
substantially (see Columns 6 and 7 of Table 12). However, this specification results in more 
frequent negative marginal utilities of leisure and housework (results not shown) than for our 
baseline specification, and it is unclear whether this framework would be reasonable to 
assume here, as while in other countries like, for example, Italy there is a reported lack of 
part-time jobs, we are not aware of similar issues for France. Therefore, we prefer to retain 
our main specification. 
 Finally, we assumed that partners only choose between various combinations of paid-
work and leisure, ignoring housework (which is then taken as equivalent to leisure), as in 
most earlier discrete choice models of family labour supply (such as, for example, Callan et 
al. (2009)). This simplified model leads to estimated elasticities that have the same sign as 
those in our preferred model though the size of the effects varies somewhat (see column 7 of 
Table 11).  
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6. Conclusions 
We study the impact of income taxation on partners’ hours of market work and 
domestic work in French couples.  We consider both married couples whose incomes are still 
subject to joint income taxation in France and cohabiting couples that were taxed 
independently at the time of our survey data. The theoretical household taxation literature 
concludes that income taxation is likely to affect not only market labour supply but also 
housework. However, it is difficult to sign a priori the effect of income taxation on partners’ 
housework.   Income taxation is likely to affect labour supply and housework hours in 
opposite directions because, for instance, downward changes in the net rewards from work 
reduce the opportunity cost of housework, making market work less attractive than 
housework. 
There is limited empirical evidence available of the effects of income taxation on 
housework. Our model extends earlier discrete choice models of family labour supply by 
modelling not only partners’ market work but also partner’s housework. The model accounts 
for participation as well as hours decisions. The use of a discrete choice specification enables 
us to incorporate non-linear taxes and welfare benefits in the household budget set. The 
choice set has 2,401 points for each couple in the sample, since we have allowed for seven 
discrete paid market-work intervals and seven discrete unpaid-work intervals, for each spouse. 
Using French time use data to estimate the model, we find that both partners’ time allocation 
decisions are responsive to changes in wage rates, household non-labour income, and the 
income tax system. In particular, we simulate a change from joint taxation of the incomes of 
married spouses to separate taxation.  
We find that partners’ housework responds significantly to changes in the own and the 
partner’s wage rate. The wage elasticities of partners’ housework hours are generally smaller 
in absolute value than those of paid work. We also conclude that replacing joint taxation with 
separate taxation of married spouses’ incomes would increase the wife’s participation in paid 
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work by 2.3%-points and her average market hours would go up by 3.7%, while her 
housework hours would drop by 2.0%. The husband would partly compensate for the changes 
in the wife’s time allocation by increasing his housework hours by 1.3% and reducing his 
market hours by 0.8%. These effects, though statistically significant, represent only a small 
step towards balancing market and non-market work of the husband and the wife. Had we not 
allowed for housework in the model, we might conclude that the husband’s leisure time 
increases while the wife’s leisure time drops following the tax reform. 
 To sum up, we find significant though small responses of partners’ hours of market 
work and housework to a change in the income tax system, from joint to separate taxation of 
married spouses’ incomes. This may perhaps be due to the small effective income tax paid by 
French married couples on average. We have not allowed here for any effects of social 
security contributions or value added tax on consumption and assumed throughout this study 
that marital status is exogenous.  Having some policy change at hand would enable one to 
better identify the causal relations at stake. Future studies should tackle these issues, as well 
as possibly model weekend hours (spillover) effects that were neglected here. 
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Figure 1.  Marginal income tax rates for France in 1998. 
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Figure 2. Average (effective) income tax rates for childless couples: the wife’s earnings 
increase while the husband’s earnings are fixed (at various thresholds). 
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Figure 3. Average (effective) income tax rates for couples with two children: the wife’s 
earnings increase while the husband’s earnings are fixed (at various thresholds). 
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Figure 4. Predicted and Actual Hours Frequencies for the (7*7*7*7) discrete choices   
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Table 1. Sample selection. 
Selection Criterion Households  
in the sample 
Households 
dropped 
Original sample size 8186  
 
Dropping single people 5287  
 
Dropping couples with one or two partners 
older than 59 years 3819 
 
Keeping in households in which both 
partners filled in the time diary 3564 245 
Dropping couples in which a partner filled in 
the time diary on an atypical day 3269 295 
Dropping couples in which partners filled in 
the time diary on Saturday or Sunday 2407 862 
Dropping couples with a partner in full-time 
education or (early)-retirees or doing 
military service 2141 266 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics. 
 Husbands Wives 
Variables Mean  St dev Mean  St dev 
Age 41.55 9.01 39.25 8.98 
Elementary school  0.08 0.28 0.10 0.30 
Lower secondary, vocational 0.06 0.24 0.10 0.30 
Lower secondary 0.37 0.48 0.28 0.45 
Upper secondary vocational 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 
Upper secondary 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.28 
University short degree 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.34 
University degree or higher 0.12 0.32 0.10 0.30 
French nationality 0.94 0.23 0.95 0.22 
Employed  0.94 0.32 0.70 0.47 
Self-employed              0.19 0.40 0.21 0.40 
Ile-de-France (region of Paris) 0.18 0.39   
Regional unemployment rate            11.28 2.35   
Married 0.79 0.41   
Number of children <18 years          1.10 1.12   
Dummy child <3 years         0.16 0.37   
Dummy child 3-5 years 0.15 0.36   
Gross hourly wage predicted 9.77 3.67           6.23         2.55 
Gross hourly wage actual                          9.85           5.94              8.35           4.92 
Usual paid work hours, weekly 29.30 16.57 19.52 17.63 
Usual paid work hours, weekly 
(excluding zeros) 
37.94 5.30 32.98 9.01 
Paid work (diary), hours - daily 6.97 3.76 4.02 3.93 
Paid work, (diary) minutes - daily 418.70 225.51 241.34 235.81 
Housework, minutes 65.27 85.45 272.49 169.26 
Total work, minutes 483.97 196.92 513.84 163.55 
“Leisure” (including sleep time  and 
personal care), minutes 
956.03 196.92 926.17 163.55 
The sample size is 2,141 couples.  Hourly wages are gross of income taxes and net 
of social security contributions.  Total work includes paid work and housework. 
For simplicity, we denote the male partner as the ‘husband’ and the female partner 
as the ‘wife’, regardless of marital status.  
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Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics: Income and Income Tax variables. 
 Q1 (25%) Q2 (Median) Q3 (75%) Mean 
Total earnings 
(€ per year) 12806 21953 32014 23876 
Non-labour  household 
income (€ per year) 0 1829 9513 7537 
Total household income 
before tax (€ per year) 21953 28813 37137 31717 
Total household income 
after tax (€ per year)  21108 26783 34426 29187 
Total tax burden (€ per year) 0 987 3136 2416 
Effective tax rate (%) 1.39 4.49 8.64 5.63 
Sample: 2,141 couples. The effective tax rate is defined as the tax amount paid divided by the 
total household income. The sample includes both married and unmarried couples.  
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Table 4.  Time Allocation of Partners (minutes per day). 
 10% Q1 Median Q3 90% 
Husband paid work 0 360 480 550 640 
Wife paid work 0 0 240 480 520 
Husband housework 0 0 30 100 180 
Wife housework 70 140 240 390 510 
Husband “Total work”   130 420 530 610 680 
Wife “Total work”   280 410 540 630 700 
Husband “leisure”   740 810 880 970 1170 
Wife Total “leisure”   730 790 880 1000 1120 
 Note: “Total work” time includes paid work and housework.  Sample 
size: 2,141 couples; week day diaries.  For simplicity, we denote the 
male partner as the ‘husband’ and the female partner as the ‘wife’, 
regardless of marital status, as the sample includes both married and 
cohabiting partners.  
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Table 5. Husband’s Share in Total Couple’s Time 
 Percentages 
 Mean  St deviation  Median  
Paid work 66.88 30.96 61.07 
Housework 19.82 22.69 12.50 
“Total work”  46.76 15.38 48.78 
Leisure 50.08 4.94 50.27 
Notes: The shares are calculated only for couples in which at 
least one spouse spends a positive amount of time on the given 
activity. “Total Work” time includes paid work and housework 
(see Section 3 for definitions).  For simplicity, we denote the 
male partner as the ‘husband’, regardless of marital status. 
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Table 6.  Estimation Results: Direct Utility functions 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Standard error 
(Husband’s leisure)^2 -0.3057 0.0251 ** 
(Husband’s housework)^2 -0.263 0.0171 ** 
(Wife’s leisure)^2 -0.2131 0.0147 ** 
(Wife’s housework)^2 -0.0742 0.0111 ** 
Income*Husband’s leisure 0.0846 0.0089 ** 
Income*Husband’s housework 0.0276 0.005 ** 
Income*Wife’s leisure 0.0564 0.0061 ** 
Income*Wife’s housework 0.0278 0.0038 ** 
Husband’s leisure* Husband’s housework -0.1468 0.0223 ** 
Husband’s leisure* Wife’s leisure -0.0249 0.0068 ** 
Husband’s leisure* Wife’s housework -0.0068 0.0085  
Wife’s leisure* Husband’s housework -0.0157 0.0105  
Wife’s leisure* Wife’s housework -0.0264 0.006 ** 
Wife’s housework * Husband’s housework -0.0983 0.0118 ** 
Income -2.1476 0.4353 ** 
Husband’s leisure 41.7887 7.663 ** 
Husband’s leisure* log age -17.3115 4.0494 ** 
Husband’s leisure* log age^2 2.4329 0.5536 ** 
Husband’s leisure* married -0.2621 0.0829 ** 
Husband’s leisure* number children 0.0459 0.0368  
Husband’s leisure* any child younger than 3 -0.2048 0.1036 ** 
Husband’s leisure* any child age 3-5 years 0.0341 0.0969  
Husband’s housework 15.4829 5.6088 ** 
Husband’s housework * log age -5.5149 2.8852 * 
Husband’s housework * log age^2 0.7975 0.3965 ** 
Husband’s housework * married -0.1988 0.0542 ** 
Husband’s housework * number children 0.114 0.0249 ** 
Husband’s housework * any child younger than 3 0.1786 0.0668 ** 
Husband’s housework * any child age 3-5 years 0.0844 0.0626  
Wife’s leisure 52.8154 6.8603 ** 
Wife’s leisure* log age -25.0188 3.7753 ** 
Wife’s leisure* log age^2 3.4764 0.5264 ** 
Wife’s leisure* married -0.2381 0.0763 ** 
Wife’s leisure* number children 0.1815 0.0378 ** 
Wife’s leisure* any child younger than 3 -0.1012 0.0876  
Wife’s leisure* any child age 3-5 years 0.1924 0.0865 ** 
Wife’s housework 24.4425 4.7226 ** 
Wife’s housework * log age -11.8946 2.5555 ** 
Wife’s housework * log age^2 1.6968 0.3555 ** 
Wife’s housework * married -0.0311 0.0489  
Wife’s housework * number children 0.2376 0.0243 ** 
Wife’s housework * any child younger than 3 0.2196 0.0536 ** 
Wife’s housework * any child age 3-5 years 
Husband’s fixed costs of market work 
Wife’s fixed costs of market work 
0.1558 
-1.9277 
-1.3231 
0.0521 
0.1312 
0.0945 
** 
** 
** 
**: significant at two-sided 5% level; *: significant at two-sided 10% level. For 
simplicity, we denote the male partner as the ‘husband’ and the female partner as the 
‘wife’, regardless of marital status. 
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Table 7. Estimation Results: Unobserved Heterogeneity 
  
Covariance Matrix 
 
Leisure 
husband 
Housework 
husband Leisure wife     
Housework 
wife 
 Leisure 
husband 
1.4284**       
(0.1123)       
Housework 
husband 
0.3418** 0.1353**     
(0.0835) (0.0388)     
Leisure wife 0.7078** 0.3169** 0.7999**   (0.0656) (0.0506) (0.0649)   
Housework 
wife 
0.3144** 0.1788** 0.4683** 0.3051** 
(0.0589) (0.0312) (0.0465) (0.0357) 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 
Leisure 
husband 
Housework 
husband Leisure wife     
Housework 
wife 
 Leisure 
husband 
1.0000       
(0.0000)       
Housework 
husband 
0.7764** 1.0000     
(0.0868) (0.0000)     
Leisure wife 0.6622** 0.9733** 1.0000   (0.0325) (0.0253) (0.0000)   
Housework 
wife 
0.4754** 0.8905** 0.9483** 1.0000 
(0.0707) (0.0568) (0.0174) (0.0000) 
**: significant at two-sided 5% level; *: significant at two-sided 10% level. 
For simplicity, we denote the male partner as the ‘husband’ and the female 
partner as the ‘wife’, regardless of marital status. 
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Table 8. Model results: Marginal Utilities  
 
 
Average marginal 
utility 
Proportion with negative marginal 
utility 
Income 2.7684 0.0000 
Husband’s leisure 0.5049 0.2662 
Husband’s housework 0.0952 0.3092 
Wife’s leisure 0.3489 0.4199 
Wife’s housework 0.3546 0.3480 
Note: Marginal utilities are computed keeping the other arguments of the couple’s 
utility function constant (see Section 2). For simplicity, we denote the male partner as 
the ‘husband’ and the female partner as the ‘wife’, regardless of marital status. 
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Table 9.  Predicted and Actual Participation and Mean hours choices  
 Husband Wife  
 
Predicted  Actual  Predicted Actual  
                       Market work  
0 hours      0.0542 0.0594 0.2938 0.2947  
Mean hours 6.8213 6.9106 4.3170 4.6285  
                      Housework  
0 hours    0.4016 0.4340 0.1681 0.1845  
Mean hours 1.2943 1.1345 4.6826 4.5636  
Note: Daily hours of work (excluding weekend days). For 
simplicity, we denote the male partner as the ‘husband’ and the 
female partner as the ‘wife’, regardless of marital status. 
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Table 10.  Own and Cross Wage and Non-Labour Income Elasticities  
 Husbands Wives 
 
Participation 
(%-points 
change) 
Average 
Hours 
 (%-change) 
Participation 
(%-points 
change) 
Average 
Hours  
(%-change) 
 
 Market work Market work 
Elasticities     
a)Wife's net wage 1% increase -0.0087    .  -0.1039 ** 0.2945 ** 0.5516 ** 
 (0. 0085) (0.0099) (0. 0123) (0.0371) 
b)Husband's net wage 1% increase  0.1104 ** 0.2025 ** -0.1213 ** -0.3093 ** 
 (0. 0062) (0.0184) (0. 0127) (0.0254) 
c)Non-labor income  1% increase  -0.0777 ** -0.1252 ** -0.1628** -0.2479 ** 
 (0. 0079) (0.0184) (0. 0203) (0.0414) 
 
 Housework Housework 
Elasticities     
a)Wife's net wage 1% increase 0.0412 ** 0.1168 ** -0.1734 ** -0.3623 ** 
 (0. 0079) (0.0287) (0. 0081) (0.0225) 
b)Husband's net wage 1% increase -0.1940 ** -0.3368 ** 0.0344 ** 0.0539   * 
 (0. 0103) (0.0564) (0. 0071) (0.0286) 
c)Non-labor income 1% increase -0.1093 ** -0.3967 ** -0.0050    .           0.0009    .           
 (0. 0185) (0.0568) (0. 0133) (0.0296) 
Notes: **: significant at two-sided 5% level; *: significant at two-sided 10% level. Standard 
errors in parentheses.  Interpretation: In response to an increase of 1% of all partnered 
women’s net wage rates, female participation in paid work increases by 0.29%-points and 
female hours of paid work increases by 0.55%.  For simplicity, we denote the male partner as 
the ‘husband’ and the female partner as the ‘wife’, regardless of marital status.    
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Table 11.  Simulated Effects of Income Tax Reforms  
 Husbands Wives 
 
Participation 
(%-points 
change) 
Average 
Hours 
 (%-change) 
Participation 
(%-points 
change) 
Average 
Hours  
(%-change) 
 Market work Market work 
Income Taxation changes     
Separate taxation of married -0.1881  * -0.7513 ** 2.3137  * 3.6599 ** 
Couples (0. 1209) (0.0066) (1.3095) (0. 0213) 
Joint taxation of cohabiting 0.1627  * 1.0413 ** -2.2528  * -3.5184 ** 
Couples (0. 1149) (0. 0075) (1.2848) (0. 0189) 
 
 Housework Housework 
Income Taxation changes     
Separate taxation of married 0.6473  *   1.2767 ** -0.8445 **  -2.0147 ** 
Couples (0. 3770) (0.0203) (0.3822) (0. 0267) 
Joint taxation of cohabiting -0.7949  * -1.7559 ** 1.1285  *  2.1869 ** 
Couples (0. 4618) (0. 0261) (0. 5262) (0. 0259) 
Notes: **: significant at two-sided 5% level; *: significant at two-sided 10% level. Standard 
errors in parentheses.  For each reform, we only consider couples who are affected by the 
reform (married couples for the first reform, cohabiting couples for the second reform).     
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Table 12.  Robustness Checks  
Net income elasticities Baseline 
specification 
New 
draws 
Reported 
wages   
No 
fixed 
costs 
Part 
time 
costs 
Fixed & 
part time 
costs 
No 
house 
work 
 Market work husband -0.1252 -0.0418 -0.2053 -0.1813 -0.0248 -0.0418 -0.1760 
Housework husband -0.3967 -0.3347 -0.4099 -0.4276 -0.2984 -0.3347 
 Market work wife -0.2479 -0.2488 -0.2172 -0.3172 -0.2683 -0.2488 -0.1935 
Housework  wife 0.0009 0.0115 0.0270 0.0155 0.0117 0.0115 
 
        Husband’s Net Wage elasticities Baseline 
specification 
New 
draws 
Reported 
wages   
No 
fixed 
costs 
Part 
time 
costs 
Fixed & 
part time 
costs 
No 
house 
work 
 Market work husband 0.2025 0.2124 0.2260 0.2465 0.1352 0.1258 0.2435 
Housework husband -0.3368 -0.4087 0.0094 -0.1265 -0.1663 -0.2391 
 Market work wife -0.3093 -0.3049 -0.2392 -0.1348 -0.2623 -0.2086 -0.3206 
Housework wife 0.0539 0.0217 0.0485 0.0178 0.0412 0.0138   
        Wife’s Net Wage elasticities Baseline 
specification 
New 
draws 
Reported 
wages   
No 
fixed 
costs 
Part 
time 
costs 
Fixed & 
part time 
costs 
No 
house 
work 
 Market work husband -0.1039 -0.0938 -0.0895 -0.0194 -0.0608 -0.0416 -0.1182 
Housework husband 0.1168 0.1050 -0.0723 -0.0549 0.0234 0.0395 
 Market work wife 0.5516 0.5567 0.4556 0.4640 0.4446 0.3829 0.6062 
Housework wife -0.3623 -0.3191 -0.3749 -0.3597 -0.2701 -0.2499 
                 
Separate income taxation  Baseline 
specification 
New 
draws 
Reported 
wages   
No 
fixed 
costs 
Part 
time 
costs 
Fixed & 
part time 
costs 
No 
house 
work (married couples only) 
Market work husband -0.7513 -0.7516 -0.6028 -0.6012 -0.4228 -0.3633 -0.8444 
Housework  husband 1.2767 1.4253 -0.0685 0.2611 0.4366 0.7650 
 Market work wife 3.6599 3.6142 2.8387 2.6277 3.0729 2.6124 3.7567 
Housework wife -2.0147 -1.6795 -1.9196 -1.7142 -1.5135 -1.3249   
Notes: Each column presents selected robustness checks results (see Section 5). The first 
column gives the baseline results (as in Tables 10 and 11).   
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Appendix A: Heckman Selection Models for Hourly Wages 
 
Table A1. Heckman selection model for the male wage rate 
   Hourly Wage Equation Coefficient  Standard error 
Potential experience 0.0457 0.0038 ** 
Potential experience squared -0.0005 0.0001 ** 
Elementary school  0.0635 0.0359 * 
Lower secondary, vocational 0.3110 0.0491 ** 
Lower secondary 0.2334 0.0376 ** 
Upper secondary vocational 0.4805 0.0553 ** 
Upper secondary 0.4998 0.0565 ** 
University short degree 0.7352 0.0580 ** 
University degree or higher 1.1217 0.0527 ** 
Dummy Single -0.1037 0.0395 ** 
Dummy Cohabiting -0.0879 0.0296 ** 
Constant 2.9003 0.1021 ** 
Selection Equation       
Potential experience 0.0278 0.0160 * 
Potential experience squared -0.0006 0.0002 ** 
Elementary school  0.1610 0.1327 
 Lower secondary, vocational 0.4884 0.1619 ** 
Lower secondary 0.3575 0.1074 ** 
Upper secondary vocational 0.5912 0.1959 ** 
Upper secondary 0.6287 0.1992 ** 
University short degree 0.7709 0.1699 ** 
University degree or higher 0.6137 0.1601 ** 
Dummy Single -0.5950 0.1073 ** 
Dummy Cohabiting -0.3696 0.0929 ** 
Dummy child <3 years         -0.1824 0.1051 * 
Dummy child 3-5 years -0.0921 0.1076 
 Dummy child 6-10 years 0.0398 0.0947 
 Dummy child 11-16 years 0.0179 0.0936 
 Number of adults in the household 0.0410 0.0563 
 Constant 0.6562 0.2990 ** 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.0224 0.1732   
Correlation between the error terms -0.0713 
  St. deviation error wage equation 0.3139 
  Observations 2193 
  **: significant at two-sided 5% level; *: significant at two-sided 10% 
level. Observations that did not complete elementary school are often 
foreigners. Regional controls are included in both equations. The 
exclusion-restrictions are not statistically significant and marital status 
affects significantly both the wage and the selection equation. 
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Table A2. Heckman selection model for the female wage rate. 
  Hourly Wage Equation   Coefficient  Standard error  
Potential experience 0.0409 0.0036 ** 
Potential experience squared -0.0004 0.0001 ** 
Elementary school  0.0982 0.0364 ** 
Lower secondary, vocational 0.2714 0.0390 ** 
Lower secondary 0.2960 0.0339 ** 
Upper secondary vocational 0.4291 0.0471 ** 
Upper secondary 0.5536 0.0414 ** 
University short degree 0.8458 0.0421 ** 
University degree or higher 1.2190 0.0447 ** 
Constant 2.7120 0.0775 ** 
Selection Equation       
Potential experience 0.0606 0.0119 ** 
Potential experience squared -0.0012 0.0002 ** 
Elementary school  0.3586 0.0927 ** 
Lower secondary, vocational 0.4606 0.1011 ** 
Lower secondary 0.4097 0.0833 ** 
Upper secondary vocational 0.6459 0.1339 ** 
Upper secondary 0.5527 0.1100 ** 
University short degree 0.8452 0.1088 ** 
University degree or higher 0.8370 0.1211 ** 
Dummy Single 0.4280 0.0720 ** 
Dummy Cohabiting 0.1811 0.0718 ** 
Dummy child <3 years         -0.5643 0.0776 ** 
Dummy child 3-5 years -0.4890 0.0756 ** 
Dummy child 6-10 years -0.3029 0.0626 ** 
Dummy child 11-16 years -0.1165 0.0607 * 
Number of adults in the household -0.0655 0.0361 * 
Constant -0.5646 0.2163 ** 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.0940 0.0419 ** 
Correlation between the error terms  0.2879 
  Standard deviation error wage equation  0.3264 
  Observations 3406 
  **: significant at two-sided 5% level; *: significant at two-sided 10% level.  
Regional controls are included in both equations. Observations that did not 
complete elementary school are often foreigners. The dummies for marital 
status were (jointly) not statistically significant in the wage equation and 
thus, they work as valid exclusion restrictions for the selection equation. 
 
